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ATTENTION GRAY MARKET SHOPPERS: K
MART CORP. V. CARTIER, INC. FAILS TO
CLARIFY THE CLOUDED AREA
OF GRAY MARKET GOODS
Gray market goods are items of foreign manufacture which bear a trade-
mark registered in the United States, as well as in a foreign country, and are
subsequently imported into the United States without the consent of the do-
mestic trademark holder.' A gray market good can usually be placed in one
of three categories.2 In the first situation, a domestic firm will purchase the
rights to use a trademark from a foreign manufacturer and register that
trademark in the United States.3 If the foreign manufacturer, or a third
party, subsequently imports the authentic goods of foreign manufacture into
the United States, the domestic trademark holder's market is being undercut
and a gray market is said to exist.' In the second case, if a domestic firm
that registers a trademark is a subsidiary of, a "parent" of, or the same firm
as a foreign trademark holder, the importation of goods by the foreign arm
of the organization, or by a third party, also gives rise to a gray market.5 In
the third instance, a gray market exists when a domestic trademark holder
authorizes a foreign firm to use its trademark abroad, and the foreign manu-
factured goods are imported into the United States by the foreign corpora-
tion or a third party.6
1. The term gray market refers to the situation where authentic goods of foreign manu-
facture are purchased abroad at lower prices than available in the United States, and then
imported into the United States and marketed at lower prices than those of authorized Ameri-
can dealers. This practice undercuts the market of the domestic trademark holder. Unlike
black market goods, gray market goods are not wholly illegal, but their ability to undercut the
domestic trademark holder's market has caused them to be eyed with suspicion, thus giving
rise to the term gray market goods. See generally Palladino, High Court Duo on Discounters:
Legal Fog Still Surrounds Gray Market Goods, Legal Times, June 20, 1988, at 19, col. 1; Riley,
Gray Market Fight Isn't Black and White, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
2. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1814 (1988).
3. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
4. Id. at 539. The plaintiff in Katzel had purchased the right to use the trademark of A.
Bourjois & Cie., E. Werthemeir & Cie., a French company which produced facial powder. Id.
The defendant purchased the products in France and subsequently imported them into the
United States without the consent of the plaintiff. Id. at 540.
5. See Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792
F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
6. K Mart. 108 S. Ct. at 1815.
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In 1921, A. Bourois & Co. v. Katzel 7 was decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and it appeared as though the gray
market would never be regulated. 8 Katzel held that the importation of au-
thentic goods bearing a trademark registered in the United States would not
infringe upon the rights of a domestic trademark holder; therefore, exclusion
of the goods would be unwarranted.9 The impetus for the Katzel decision
was the universality theory of trademark law.'° According to this theory, a
trademark did not confer upon its owner the right to monopolize a product's
distribution, but rather functioned merely to protect the public from being
deceived by imitation goods." In response to the laissez faire attitude es-
poused by the Second Circuit in Katzel, Congress speedily enacted section
526 of the Tariff Act of 192212 prohibiting the importation of foreign manu-
factured goods bearing trademarks registered in the United States. Section
526 was later reenacted in its entirety as section 526 of the Tariff Act of
1930.13
The United States Department of Treasury did not initially envision ex-
ceptions to the ban on gray market goods that section 526 created.' 4 In
7. 275 F. at 539.
8. By the time Katzel was decided, the gray market already had been the subject of
thirty-five years of litigation resulting in the unimpeded importation of gray market goods.
Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916) (holding that the importation
of authentic trademarked goods was legal); see Russia Cement Co. v. Frauenhar, 133 F. 518
(1904), cert. denied, 196 U.S. 640 (1905); Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1886).
9. 275 F. at 543.
10. The epitome of the universality theory is espoused in Katzel. Id. at 539.
11. Id. at 543. When the case finally reached the United States Supreme Court, however,
Justice Holmes reversed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and initiated what is now known as the territoriality theory of trademark law. A.
Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1922). This approach views the source of trademark
protection as the product of a particular sovereign state, thus making abstract discussion of the
genuineness of a trademark meaningless. Note, The Greying ofAmerican Trademarks: The
Genuine Exclusion Act and the Incongruity of Customs Regulation 19 CFR. § 133.21, 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 106 (1986) (illustrating that the customs regulations are inconsistent
with the intent of the Tariff Act of 1930).
12. Ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975, superceded by Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 526, 46
Stat. 590, 741 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1986)).
13. The Tariff Act of 1930 states in part:
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign
manufacture if such merchandise ... bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by
a corporation or association created or organized, within the United States, and reg-
istered in the patent office ... unless written consent of the owner of such trademark
is produced at the time of making entry.
19 U.S.C. § 1526.
14. Kersner & Stein, Judicial Construction of Section 526 and the Importation of Gray
Market Goods: From Total Exclusion to Unimpeded Entry, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
251, 261 (1986).
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1936, however, the Customs Service regulations, which the United States
Department of Treasury promulgated as a mechanism for enforcing section
526, began to make exceptions to the total ban on gray market goods.'" The
regulations permitted the importation of goods bearing registered United
States trademarks if the foreign and domestic trademarks were owned by the
same person, partnership, association, or corporation. 16  This "related" ex-
ception was deleted in 1959,17 but more exceptions would later surface.' 8
In 1972, the United States Department of Treasury issued the current
Customs Service regulations in an attempt to codify what it believed to be
exceptions to the ban on gray market goods.' 9 The "common control
' 20
and "same company ' 21 exceptions once again allowed the importation of
goods simultaneously bearing foreign and domestic trademarks if one com-
pany had control, in some manner, over both trademarks. 22 The "author-
ized use" exception, 23  however, allowed the importation of foreign
manufactured products bearing American trademarks if the domestic trade-
mark holder authorized a foreign company to produce that product
abroad. 24  The Treasury Department's 1972 promulgation 25 was an attempt
to eliminate ambiguity about what are acceptable gray market goods.2 6 The
Customs Service regulations, however, have been challenged as antithetical
15. T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936).
16. Id. at 337.
17. T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433 (1959).
18. T.D. 72,266, 6 Cust. B. & Dec. 550 (1972).
19. 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.21(c) (1), (c) (2), & (c) (3) (1988). The regulations state that the
restrictions on the importation of foreign goods bearing trademarks simulating or copying a
United States trademark shall not be applicable where:
(c) (1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the same
person or business entity; (2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name
owners are parent and subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to common owner-
ship or control. (3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner; ....
Id. (cross reference omitted).
20. See id. § 133.21(c) (1), (2).
21. Id. § 133.21(c) (3).
22. In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811'(1988), Justice Kennedy consolidated
the common control and same company exceptions under the heading of common control. Id.
at 1817.
23. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1).
24. Id.
25. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1055 (1986). The government was actually claiming that the 1972 promulgation was
an attempt to solidify the long-standing interpretation of the Customs Service. Id. The court
found that the Customs Service "had continuing questions concerning the reading of the stat-
ute." Id. The court, however, did not see any clarification in the 1972 promulgation. Id.
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to the purpose of section 526.27
In 1984, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
confronted the gray market exceptions in Coalition to Preserve the Integrity
of American Trademarks v. United States (COPIA T 1).28 Two retailers of
gray market goods, K Mart and 47th Street Photo, initially intervened as
defendants, and 47th Street Photo moved to dismiss on the ground that the
court lacked proper jurisdiction.29 The court determined that the gray mar-
ket exceptions promulgated by the Treasury Department accorded with the
aim and purpose of section 526 and were thus valid.3" On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit consolidated
the issues in Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v.
United States (COPIAT 11). 3 ' The District of Columbia Circuit subse-
quently determined that there was proper jurisdiction3 2 and held that the
customs regulations could not limit section 526 in such a manner.3 3 The
court held the regulations inconsistent with the original purpose of section
526. 3 1 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Appel-
late Court's ruling on jurisdiction35 sub nom K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 36
The merits of the case, however, were scheduled for reargument later in the
term to allow Justice Kennedy, newly appointed to the Court, to participate
in the matter.37 The Court of Appeals' decision was ultimately affirmed in
part and reversed in part.38
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in a case with many separate opin-
27. See id. (holding that the customs regulations are a reasonable exercise of administra-
tively initiated enforcement); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988) (holding that the
customs regulations were not inconsistent with the Tariff Act of 1930).
28. 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984) [hereinafter COPIAT I], aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trade Marks v. United States, 790 F.2d
903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
29. Id. at 847. Forty Seventh Street Photo claimed that the United States Court of Inter-
national Trade possessed exclusive jurisdiction over claims concerning § 526 of the Tariff Act.
Id. The court, however, found that under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 federal question jurisdiction was
present, thus invalidating 47th Street's claim. Id.
30. Id. at 852.
31. 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter COPIAT II], aff'd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
32. Id. at 905.
33. Id. at 918.
34. Id. at 908.
35. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 950, 960 (1988), reargued 108 S. Ct. 1811
(1988).
36. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
37. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 960; see also Chicago Daily Law Bull., May 31, 1988, at col. 1.
38. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1817-18.
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ions, merged the common control and same company exceptions under the
heading of common control and determined these exceptions to be consistent
with section 526. 3 9 In Justice Kennedy's view, deferential treatment must be
accorded to the interpretation of an administrative agency when not in direct
conflict with the statute.4° In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices Marshall and Stevens, attested to the validity of the common
control exceptions, not due to administrative deference, but due to the belief
that Congress never intended section 526 to protect thope who are subject to
these exceptions.4" Justice Scalia, dissenting, found that the common con-
trol exceptions clearly conflicted with section 526 and were therefore
invalid.42
Justice Kennedy, writing for another majority, found the authorized use
exception invalid because it clearly conflicted with the statute.43 Justice
Brennan, dissenting, found the authorized use exception wholly consistent
with section 526.44 Concurring with the majority on the invalidity of the
authorized use exception, Justice Scalia opined that Congress was fully
aware of the possibilities pertaining to trademark transferability, thus elimi-
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1817. Justice Kennedy stated that if "the agency regulation is not in conflict
with the plain language of the statute, a reviewing court must give deference to the agency's
interpretation of the statute." Id.
41. See id. at 1820 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bren-
nan cites a plethora of facts indicating that the United States has never intended to confer
trademark protection on affiliates of foreign manufacturers. Id. Justice Brennan states that
the jingoist, protectionistic flavor of § 526 bespeaks an intent, characteristic of the times, to
protect only domestic interests. Id. Justice Brennan also contends that the legislative history
supports this protectionistic interpretation. Id. at 1825.
42. Id. at 1831 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia at-
tempted to attach what he thought Congress meant when they inserted the words "of foreign
manufacture" into § 526. Id. Hence, Justice Scalia purported that foreign manufacture means
manufactured abroad, not merely manufactured by a foreign company. Id. In addition, Jus-
tice Scalia claimed that the majority's interpretation of these pivotal words would allow the
importation of goods manufactured abroad if an American company held the foreign trade-
mark. Id. at 1832.
43. Id. at 1818.
44. Id. at 1828 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan
felt § 526 was implemented when trademark law was radically different than its present status.
Id. It was impossible to license a trademark in 1922 and any attempt to do so would result in
abandonment of the trademark. See, e.g., Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers Agency, 3
F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir. 1924) (holding that trademark rights could not be assigned except in the
sale of a business) (superceded by the Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 60 Stat. 443 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982))). Confusion as to the scope of trademark law
during this formative period made the implementation of § 526 all the more difficult. With
this in mind, Justice Brennan claimed that § 526 did not unambiguously protect a United
States trademark holder from gray market competition, thus making the authorized use excep-
tion a reasonable interpretation of the statute. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1828.
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nating ambiguous interpretations of section 526. 5 He asserted that the
Court, therefore, should not defer to the agency's interpretation and find the
"authorized use" exception contrary to the purpose of section 526.46
This Note identifies the basic problems created by the importation of gray
market goods. Next, this Note illustrates the events leading up to the enact-
ment of section 526 and examines the circumstances surrounding the pas-
sage of the Tariff Act of 1922. It then examines the United States Customs
Service's interpretations of the language of section 526 and how the courts
have construed these interpretations. Finally, this Note concludes that,
although certain questions pertaining to the validity of the customs regula-
tions have been seemingly laid to rest, the Supreme Court's failure to make a
comprehensive and definitive examination of the gray market in K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. perpetuates the problems indigenous to the clouded
area known as the gray market.
I. GRAY MARKET GOODS: COMPLEX CONSIDERATIONS FOR
PURCHASERS AND MERCHANTS
Gray market goods run the gamut from perfume4 7 to automobiles.48
Each year billions of dollars worth of gray market goods are imported into
the United States and gray market importation seems to be on the rise.49
Purchasers as well as merchants are affected by the voluminous tide of gray
market goods and, in many cases, the repercussions of gray market importa-
tion are not immediately felt.
A. Gray Market Goods and Considerations of Quality
The gray market appears to benefit consumers by offering brand name
goods at reduced prices.50 Gray market goods, however, are often of lower
45. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1835 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 1833.
47. See Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service, 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla.
1983). The court held in a memorandum opinion that authentic perfume imported without the
consent of the domestic trademark holder was permissible. Id. at 420.
48. See Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931) (superceded by the
Tariff Act of 1930, 42 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982)). The court held that an automobile imported
for personal use without the consent of the domestic trademark holder violated § 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930. Id. at 1039.
49. See generally Riley, supra note 1, at 1, col. 4 (estimates of gray market importation
range from 5 to 10 billion dollars).
50. Authentic goods can, in many instances, be purchased abroad at prices much lower
than comparable goods available in the United States. Id. These goods can then be profitably
resold at prices lower than those offered by authorized distributors. Id. For an early example
of this situation see Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 26 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1886) (permitting the
importation of Hungarian Water without the consent of the domestic trademark holder).
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quality than goods sold by authorized distributors.5 1 In many cases, gray
market goods are subject to different production standards than goods mar-
keted by authorized distributors, thus giving rise to inferior and even unsafe
products.5 2 Many gray market products are accompanied by instruction
manuals written entirely in a foreign language, thereby causing much confu-
sion and dissatisfaction among consumers.5 3 Moreover, improper product
use due to unintelligible instructions can diminish the longevity of the prod-
uct and may eventually result in physical injury to the consumer. 54 Purchas-
ers of gray market goods are also plagued by the fact that numerous
authorized dealers do not honor warranties on such products.5 5 Often, only
after a product malfunctions do gray market consumers realize that the
products they purchased did not include warranties.5 6 While facially attrac-
tive to the consumer, gray market goods possess many latent drawbacks that
can render gray market shopping more costly than purchasing higher priced
goods from authorized distributors.57
B. Gray Market Goods and Considerations of Goodwill
Although the importation of gray market goods may cause an immediate
pecuniary loss to authorized distributors, damage to the goodwill of a prod-
uct can be potentially more devastating.58 Owners of domestic trademarks
spend large amounts of money in an effort to foster the goodwill of their
trademarks.5 9 Consumers recognize trademarks as assurances of quality and
reliability. Moreover, the goodwill identified with a trademark can be a
product's major selling point.6 ° Due to their inferiority and variances in
quality from goods that authorized dealers distribute, gray market goods can
damage the goodwill that domestic dealers establish.6 ' Further, importers of
51. See Note, Vivitar Corp. v. United States: Protection Against Gray Market Goods Under
19 US.C Section 1526, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 179, 190 (1986) (illustrating various peripheral
issues pertaining to gray market goods). See generally Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F.
Supp. 1163, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
52. Note, supra note 51, at 190.





58. 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.8 (1973). ("Goodwill
is a business value which reflects the basic human propensity to continue doing business with a
seller who has offered goods and services which the customer likes and has found adequate to
fulfill his needs.").
59. Note, supra note 51, at 198.
60. See generally Note, Preventing The Importation and Sale of'Genuine Goods Bearing
American-Owned Trademarks. Protecting an American Goodwill, 35 ME. L. REV. 315 (1983).
61. Osawa & Co., 589 F. Supp. at 1172-73.
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gray market goods, unlike authorized distributors, do not have the same in-
centives to ensure the quality and maintenance of goods marketed. 62 Per-
mitting the importation of gray market goods allows foreign importers to
market the product based on the goodwill of the domestic trademark
holder.63 The gray market, therefore, offers unjust enrichment to importers
of gray market goods with potentially devastating results to holders of do-
mestic trademarks.
Traditionally, gray market litigation involves suits brought against gov-
ernmental agencies.' Moreover, many courts refuse to hear private actions
on gray market issues, thereby limiting the relief available to the domestic
trademark holder.6 5 Increasing gray market importation, however, creates a
need for private suits to protect the interests of the domestic trademark
holder.
Gray market goods pose problems which are not immediately evident to
consumers, as well as merchants.66 The benefit obtained by consumers is
illusory, at best. 67 Harm suffered by holders of domestic trademarks can
also affect consumers by reducing the incentive of the domestic trademark
holder to improve upon their product. These problems, combined with is-
sues of international trade and international relations, have generated con-
siderable legislation and litigation.
1I. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF THE IMPORTATION OF GRAY
MARKET GOODS
A. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel: Perpetuation of the Universality Theory
of Trademark Law Prompting Congressional Action
The gray market did not reach its modern era until the first quarter of the
twentieth century. 68 In A. Bourois & Co. v. Katzel, 69 the Second Circuit,
62. Id. at 1168.
63. Id. Some have gone so far as to claim that "[g]ray marketers are parasites who live off
U.S. intellectual property owners and suck their blood." Riley, supra note 1, at 22, col. I
(quoting trade specialist Steven P. Kersner).
64. Restani, An Introduction to the Gray Market Controversy, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
235, 244-47 (1987).
65. The Court of International Trade lacks jurisdiction to hear private gray market litiga-
tion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (1982). For the pertinent language of the code provision, see
infra note 277. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has also indicated that private,
gray market suits are better suited to be heard at the district court level. Vivitar Corp. v.
United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
66. See infra notes 263-73 and accompanying text.
67. Note, supra note 51, at 198.
68. For purposes of this Note, the starting point for the modern era of the gray market
will be attributed to A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689
(1923). Prior to 1922, the courts grappled with the concept of the gray market on a number of
[Vol. 38:933
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relying primarily on the universality theory7" and prior authority,7" ada-
mantly refused to recognize broad protections emanating from trademark
law.72
In Katzel, 73 the plaintiff purchased the rights to use the trademarks and
trade names of the French company, E. Wertheimer & Cie., in the United
States.74 Among these trademarks was the JAVA name, which was attrib-
uted to facial powder. 75 The defendant, Katzel, purchased the JAVA pow-
der marketed by Wertheimer in France, and subsequently imported and sold
the powder in the United States. 76 The district court granted an injunction
preventing Katzel from marketing the product 77 but the Second Circuit, re-
lying on the universality principle, 78 reversed the district court and refused
to bar the importation of the powder because it was, in fact, authentic.79
Katzel has been credited with prompting congressional action to protect do-
mestic trademark holders from the influx of gray market goods.8" The
repercussions of the Tariff Act of 1922, however, have been felt for over fifty
years.81 Passage of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 set the stage for the
occasions. In Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), the plaintiff con-
tracted for rights to sell Hungarian water in the United States and Great Britain. Id. at 19.
The defendant, however, purchased the product abroad from third parties and imported it for
sale into the United States. Id. The court held that a trademark functions only to denote the
authenticity of a product, thus upholding the sale of these goods by the defendant. Id. at 20;
see also Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916) (upholding the impor-
tation of gray market goods and holding that the Trade Mark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84,
33 Stat. 724, repealed by Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, § 526(a), 42 Stat. 858, 975,
only prohibited the importation of goods which are not genuine, thus permitting the importa-
tion of gray market goods because they bear an authentic trademark).
69. 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
70. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
71. Katzel, 275 F. at 540-43. The Court considered Apollinaris, 27 F. at 18; Russia Ce-
ment Co. v. Frauenhar, 133 F. 518 (2d Cir. 1904), cert. denied, 196 U.S. 640 (1908); and Fred
Gretsch Mfg., 238 F. at 780.




76. Id. at 540.
77. Id.
78. For an illustration of the universality principle, see supra notes 10-11 and accompany-
ing text.
79. Katzel, 275 F. at 543.
80. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (1988).
81. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 has been subjected to numerous interpretations
by the courts. See, e.g, Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 1089 (1986); Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir.
1931); United States v. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. 77 (D.N.Y. 1957), vacated, 358 U.S. 915
(1958).
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ensuing controversy over the importation of gray market goods.12
B. Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922. Midnight Legislation with Long
Term Ramifications
Congress passed section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 in response to the
Second Circuit's holding in Katzel permitting the lawful importation of for-
eign manufactured goods bearing a trademark registered in the United
States.83 Commentators suggest that if the Supreme Court had overruled
Katzel prior to the passage of the Tariff Act, Congress would have never
enacted section 526.84 The congressional records pertaining to the enact-
ment of section 526 are sparse.85 The legislative history that exists, however,
foreshadows the confusion,8 6 dissension, 7 and displeasure 8 that would sub-
sequently surround section 526.
The route taken by section 526 to the Senate floor was probably dictated
by the seemingly urgent mood set by the Katzel decision.8 9 Rather than
82. The confusion of the participating senators was an ominous foreshadowing of the gray
market conflict. See infra notes 85-105 and accompanying text.
83. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1815. Contra Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1561 (stating that Katzel was
merely one reason prompting the passage of § 526).
84. Kersner & Stein, supra note 14, at 255. The failure to enact § 526, however, probably
would have made the existence of various merchants, customs officials, lawyers, judges, and
legal commentators much easier.
85. Vivitar, 761 F.2d 1552, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
86. 62 CONG. REC. 11,602-05 (statement of Senator McCumber) (1922). Senator Mc-
Cumber was apparently confused about the scope and purpose of § 526. The Senator misun-
derstood the facts in Katzel and believed the defendant to be in breach of contract with the
plaintiff. Id. at 11,604. He therefore believed that section 526's prohibition on the importation
of goods would pertain to situations where the importation was violative of an existing con-
tract. Id.
87, Id. at 11,604 (statement of Senator Moses). Senator Moses was opposed to enacting
§ 526 because "(ilt is a matter particularly of international relations bearing upon our interna-
tional treaty and trademark conventions and is a proper subject for either the Committee on
Foreign Relations or the Committee on Patents to discuss and consider." Id. at 11,602. Real-
izing the potential ramifications of implementing hastily thought out legislation, Senator
Moses stated:
[I]f this measure is to be determined at all, if it is to be taken up by the Senate at all,
it should not be taken up under conditions such as now confront the consideration of
this amendment, when only a few minutes may be permitted to discuss the great
constitutional and legal questions involved and when the subject matter of the whole
amendment belongs properly to other committees.
Id. at 11,603.
88. Id. at 11,603 (statement of Senator Moses). Senator Moses thought that the applica-
tion of § 526 as initially proposed would conflict with other legislation. Id.
89. Section 526 was hurriedly inserted into the Tariff Act of 1922. See K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). "The hastily drafted provision was introduced as 'a midnight amendmen(t)' on the floor
of the Senate." Id. (quoting 62 CONG. REC. 11,602 (1922) (remarks of Senator Moses)).
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waiting for the Supreme Court to overrule the decision, which it did three
months later,90 Congress inserted section 526 into the Tariff Act of 1922.91
As introduced, section 526 made it unlawful to import merchandise bearing
a trademark registered in the patent and trademark office of the United
States unless written consent of the trademark's owner was procured prior to
the product's importation.
92
During the brief floor debate, however, Senator Lenroot posed the now
famous "wonder flour" 93 hypothetical which resulted in section 526 only
applying to goods of foreign manufacture, rather than to all imported goods
bearing a registered United States trademark.9 4 In the course of the hypo-
thetical, Senator Lenroot queried whether section 526 would apply to a per-
son who purchased an American produced bag of flour in Canada, and then
subsequently brought the product back into the United States. 95 The obvi-
ous answer was no, and with this in mind, Senator McCumber proposed that
the words "of foreign manufacture" be inserted into section 526.96 The ini-
tial bill also lacked the provision that the trademark be owned by a "citizen
of the United States or by a corporation or association created or organized
within the United States."97 When the House later discovered this over-
sight, they added the requirement of domesticity." In its codified version,
section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 stated:
It shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchan-
dise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign,
print package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark owned by
a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized
within the United States, and registered in the patent and trade-
mark office ... unless written consent of the owner of such trade-
mark is produced at the time of making entry. 99
90. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
91. Ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975, superceded by Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 526, 46
Stat. 590, 741 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1986)).
92. 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922).
93. For further discussion of Senator Lenroot's "wonder flour" hypothetical see K Mart,
108 S. Ct. at 1811; Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (1985), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 1985 (1986); Kersner & Stein, supra note 14, at 259.
94. 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922) (statement of Senator Lenroot).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Compare id. at 11,602-05 with H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922)
(The initial bill did not contain the requirement that the trademark holder be a United States
citizen.).
98. H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922).
99. The current version is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
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Although the floor debate lasted only ten minutes, "oo it demonstrated the
unsettled scope of section 526. Senator Sutherland believed the bill would
function only to prevent fraud.'' Senator McCumber, on the other hand,
viewed the bill as a remedy to the harms that American manufacturers suf-
fered resulting from the universality theory of trademark law.'° 2 The legis-
lative history of section 526 has been described as a convoluted mess that
offers no palpable explanation of the act. 10 3 Others described the legislative
history as conferring absolute and unqualified property rights upon holders
of American trademarks."o The floor debate illustrated the confusion over
the scope and purpose of section 526. The brief debate and Senator McCum-
ber's proposals, however, failed to clarify its purpose, causing the Customs
Service and the courts to reach conflicting interpretations of section 526.105
C Interpretations of Section 526 by the United States Customs Service
The Tariff Act of 1930106 reenacted section 526 of the 1922 Tariff Act
without revision.'0 7 Beginning in 1923, the United States Department of
Treasury issued Customs Service regulations as a method of enforcing sec-
100. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
101. 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922). Circuit Judge Silberman, in COPIAT II, makes an
interesting observation in regard to Senator Sutherland's comments during the floor debate.
790 F.2d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). Senator Sutherland, upon being informed that an Ameri-
can product purchased in Canada and then brought back into the United States would be
illegal, exclaimed "and it ought to be." Id. Judge Silberman claimed that this revealed a
broader goal than articulated by Senator Sutherland, and his stated goal of merely eradicating
fraud should be taken with a "grain of salt." Id.
102. 62 CONG. REC. 11,604 (1922) (statement of Senator McCumber). Senator McCumber
gave an illustration dealing with an American company which purchased the patent and trade-
mark rights of Bayer aspirin from a German company. Senator McCumber stated that the
American trademark holder would have a remedy against subsequent importation of Bayer
aspirin due to the protections of patent law. Id. If the patent expired, however, the trademark
would offer no protection to such importation. Id. Senator McCumber claimed that: "Ameri-
can purchasers of these rights are entirely unprotected, and this [bill] is to give the opportunity
to protect the American purchaser [of the trademark]. That is all there is to it and there is no
treaty against it." Id.
103. See VNitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1065 (1986). The court, in Vivitar, could not identify limitations on the provisions as
a result of the unclear congressional intent. Id. at 1565.
104. See COPIATII, 790 F.2d at 910. The court did concede, however, that the debate did
not "unequivocally resolve all questions about the scope of section 526." Id. at 912.
105. Compare id., (stating that § 526 did not contain implied exceptions) with Olympus
Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988) (hold-
ing that the exceptions promulgated by the Customs Service were reasonable).
106. Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1986)).
107. Id. § 526, 46 Stat. at 741. Compare id. with Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat.
858, 975 (reenacted by the Tariff Act of 1930).
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tion 526.' Originally, the content of the regulations and section 526 were
identical.' °9 Between 1936 and 1972, however, the Customs Service promul-
gated exceptions to the literal wording of section 526.110 Some commenta-
tors have suggested that the constant vacillation by the Customs Service on
these exceptions caused the Customs Service to interpret its own regulations
in an inconsistent manner."'
The first Customs Service regulations were issued almost contemporane-
ously with the passage of section 526.112 The 1923 regulations merely re-
stated section 526's ban on the importation of foreign goods bearing a
trademark registered in the United States." 3 Due to the reenactment of sec-
tion 526 in the Tariff Act of 1930, the Customs Service again issued regula-
tions identical to the wording of section 526."' In 1936, the Treasury
Department promulgated regulations deviating from the literal wording of
section 526."15 Goods possessing both a foreign and domestic trademark
could be imported if both trademarks were owned by the same person, part-
nership, association or corporation. 1 6 In 1953, the Customs Service ex-
panded this "same company" exception to incorporate an exception for
companies that were in some way related.' 17 In 1959, the Customs Service
deleted the related company exception 1"' and the regulations stood as they
had in 1936.
In 1972, the Customs Service issued the current set of regulations to cod-
ify the exceptions to the ban on gray market importation."' 9 The 1972 regu-
lations again permitted the importation of foreign goods bearing trademarks
registered in the United States if the foreign company and the domestic
108. Kersner & Stein, supra note 14, at 253.
109. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
110. See T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936) (adding the same company exception); see
also T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 383-84 (1953) (expanding the same company exception to
include related companies).
111. Note, The Gray Market Case: Trademark Rights and Consumer Interests, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 838, 842 (1986); see also Note, supra note 11, at 101.
112. Kersner & Stein, supra note 14, at 261.
113. Cust. Reg. art. 476 (1923) (stating that "trademarks owned by an American citizen or
by a corporation or association created or organized within the United States are entitled to
the protection of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 if the mark has been registered within
the United States by a person ... domiciled within the United States . .
114. Cust. Reg. art. 517 (1931).
115. T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936).
116. Id.
117. See T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 383-84 (1953), amended by T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas.
Dec. 433-34 (1959). (The regulation stated that the term "related company pertained to any
person, partnership association, or corporation which legitimately controls or is controlled by
the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality").
118. See T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433-34 (1959).
119. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1988); see supra note 19.
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trademark holder were the same company, in a parent-subsidiary relation-
ship or under common ownership or control.' 2 ° Moreover, these regulations
allowed importation of goods manufactured abroad bearing a registered
United States trademark authorized by the domestic trademark holder.' 21
The Customs Service, in issuing these exceptions to the ban on gray mar-
ket importation, continued to deviate from the literal language of section
526.122 As a result of challenges to these exceptions, the courts were called
upon to determine the validity of the Customs Service regulations culminat-
ing in the Supreme Court's decision in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 123
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 526 AND ATTEMPTS TO
JUSTIFY THE GRAY MARKET EXCEPTIONS PROMULGATED BY
THE CUSTOMS SERVICE
A. Pre-1972 Litigation
Before the customs regulations created exceptions to section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, the statute was narrowly interpreted in Sturges v. Clark
D. Pease, Inc. 124 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined
section 526 to determine if it barred importation of automobiles for personal
use.' 25 The plaintiff purchased a used Hispano-Suiza automobile in France
and attempted to import it into the United States.'26 The car bore the H-S
trademark registered domestically to Clark D. Pease, Inc., of New York. 27
Judge Augustus Hand, writing for the court, stated that section 526 was not
limited to facts analogous to Katzel. 128 He stated, however, that although
section 526 was a reaction to Katzel, that fact alone did not settle the scope
of the Tariff Act of 1930.129 Reading section 526 literally, the court barred
the importation of the automobile even though it was not intended to be
120. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1), (2).
121. Id. § (c) (3).
122. Compare T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 383 (1953); T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433
(1959); T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936) (exceptions to the ban on gray market goods)
with Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1986) (literal wording of section).
123. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
124. 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931).
125. Id. at 1036.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1037. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79. Counsel for the plaintiff in
Sturges argued that the term merchandise, under §§ 141, 142 and 143 of chapter 3, title 19 of
the United States Code only applied to goods intended for sale. Id. at 1036-37. Judge Hand
replied that a resale would be possible, thus interfering with the "right to control the use of the
mark in this country which was the apparent purpose of the congressional legislation." Id. at
1037.
129. Id. at 1037.
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resold.13 ° The Sturges case signifies that, prior to the issuance of the Cus-
toms Service's exceptions, the courts interpreted section 526 as a total ban
on the importation of gray market goods.
United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 131 a case brought on anti-trust grounds,
involved a French company and three American associate companies that
distributed trademarked toiletries. 13 2 The French company granted to its
American associates the exclusive right to distribute Guerlain products in
the United States133 and the Guerlain trademark was subsequently regis-
tered in the United States."'3 The government, however, claimed that the
defendant's invocation of section 526 to prevent importation of Guerlain
goods by third parties violated section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 135
The suit alleged that such use of section 526 constituted an attempt to mo-
nopolize the sale of trademarked products within the United States. 136 The
court determined that an American company that is part of a single interna-
tional enterprise is offered no protection under section 526 from the importa-
tion of goods that the foreign parent company sold abroad.' 37 In arriving at
this conclusion, the court viewed previous gray market decisions' 38 and the
legislative history of section 526' as indicative of an intent to protect
American manufacturers who dealt at arms length with foreign companies,
not those who were part of an international business conglomerate.' 40
The Guerlain court ultimately approved the prevailing Customs Service
regulations recognizing the related company exception to section 526's ban
on gray market importation. 141 The court, however, based its decision pri-
130. Id. at 1037-38.




135. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
136. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 79.
137. Id. at 82-83.
138. The court examined the reasoning and rationale behind A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,
275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238
F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916) (superceded by the Tariff Act of 1930, 42 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1982)); and
Apollinaris v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
139. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 81. The court reviewed the brief legislative history of § 526
and concluded that "[nievertheless, it appears from that debate that the purpose of the section
was to protect the rights of Americans who bought foreign trademarks and that it was aimed
at the Katzel decision in the Court of Appeals ... " Id.
140. Id. at 91. The issue in Guerlain was not settled, however, because appeal was taken to
the Supreme Court. 358 U.S. 915 (1958). The government subsequently made a motion to
vacate claiming that a motion to dismiss would be filed in the district court. Id. The Customs
Service, however, viewed the lower court ruling in regard to § 526 as controlling. Id.; Kersner
& Stein, supra note 14, at 269.
141. 155 F. Supp. at 80.
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marily on antitrust grounds, limiting the persuasiveness of its examination
and approval of the related company exception. 142 Guerlain has been
credited as the impetus for the Customs Service's promulgation of the 1972
regulations. 143 The court's approval of the regulations in a case primarily
concerned with violations of antitrust law perpetuated the tension between
the Customs Service regulations and section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
B. Vivitar Corp. v. United States and Olympus Corp. v. United States:
Picture Perfect Illustrations of the Conflict Between Customs
Service Regulations 19 C.FR. § 133.21(c)(1), (c)(2),
(c)(3) and Section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930
After Guerlain, over a quarter of a century passed before the gray market
issue was the subject of major litigation. 1" Vivitar Corp. v. United States"14
and Olympus Corp. v. United States146 illustrate the diverse problems in the
gray market while indicating that interpretation of the Customs Service reg-
ulations remained unsettled.
In Vivitar, the plaintiff, a California corporation, challenged the 1972 Cus-
toms Service regulations as contrary to section 526 of the Tariff Act of
1930.147 Vivitar Corporation, a worldwide distributor of photographic
equipment, registered the Vivitar trademark in the United States in 1966."'8
Vivitar asserted that authentic Vivitar products were being purchased
abroad and imported without Vivitar's consent, thus undercutting the com-
142. The court viewed the dispute as whether it would be a violation of antitrust law for an
unauthorized manufacturer to exclude imported goods by attempting to invoke section 526 of
the Tariff Act of 1930. Id.
143. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. 840, 849 (1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, COPIATII,
790 F.2d 903 (1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
144. For a foreshadowing of the gray market litigation that would occur in the mid 1980's,
see Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
vacated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). In Mamiya, the plaintiff claimed that § 32 of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946 barred the importation of authentic, foreign manufactured goods that
the plaintiff had exclusive rights to market and distribute in the United States. Id. at 1065.
The defendant alleged that the Mamiya company and another company, Osawa of Japan, were
actually doing business worldwide. Id. at 1068. The court, however, found that the suppos-
edly controlling corporation owned only seven percent of the company's stock, thus, the com-
mon control exception was not applicable. Id. at 1079. Subsequently, the court of appeals
vacated the district court injunction against Masel Supply Co. because the plaintiff failed to
prove damages sufficient to justify a preliminary injunction. 719 F.2d at 42.
145. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
146. 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988).
147. 761 F.2d at 1555.
148. Id. at 1556.
[Vol. 38:933
Attention Gray Market Shoppers
pany's United States sales.14 9 Moreover, Vivitar alleged that its goodwill
was at stake and that unauthorized sales of Vivitar products would be detri-
mental to the reputation of the company. 5 '
Vivitar originally sued in the United States Court of International
Trade,' 51 which subsequently upheld the customs regulations. 152 On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explored whether
section 526 provided an American company holding a United States trade-
mark with an absolute right to demand that the Customs Service bar the
unauthorized importation of goods bearing a trademark registered in the
United States.' 53 The court examined the unique circumstances surround-
ing the enactment of section 526 and determined that the statute did not
require the Customs Service to exclude all gray market goods.' 54 Although
upholding the validity of the customs regulations, the court indicated that
the regulations did not not control the scope and protection of section
526. "' In doing so, the Vivitar court shied away from a definitive ruling on
the scope of section 526,156 thereby suggesting that this battle would best be
fought at the district court level. "' Rather than thrusting themselves into
the midst of the problem, the Vivitar court left the determination of the lim-
its of section 526 to future courts. 158
In Olympus, the plaintiff, a wholly owned subsidiary of Olympus Optimia
Company of Japan, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the en-
forcement of the authorized use exception promulgated by the Customs Ser-
vice.' 59 K Mart and 47th Street Photo imported and offered for sale, at
reduced prices, authentic Olympus products 160 obtained via the gray mar-
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1419 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761
F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). Judge Restani found that the
court had jurisdiction to hear the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3), (4) (1982), because the
case was a dispute arising out of the laws of international trade. Id. at 1427.
152. Id. at 1420.
153. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552.
154. Id. at 1569-70.
155. Id. at 1570.
156. See Note, supra note 51, at 190.
157. 761 F.2d at 1572 (Davis, J., concurring).
158. See Note, supra note 51, at 190.
159. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d
Cir. 1986).
160. Besides electronic products the gray market has a range of goods analogous to the
"regular" trade markets. Items available on the gray market range from cosmetics to
automobiles. See Comment, Olympus Corp. v. United States: The Second Circuit Comes Full
Circle on Trademark Law: Allowing The Gray Market to Thrive on Ultra Vires Customs Regu-
lations, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 337 (1987); see also supra notes 47-48 and accompanying
text.
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ket. '6 Olympus argued that section 526 should be read literally and that
the authorized use exception was inconsistent with the plain language of sec-
tion 526.162 Appeal to the Second Circuit was taken from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York to determine the valid-
ity of the customs regulations. 163 The Second Circuit found that the regula-
tions the Customs Service had promulgated were consistent with the Tariff
Act of 1930.164 Rather than upholding the customs regulations based on a
literal reading of the statute, the court instead extracted from the statute's
brief legislative history the congressional intent to allow exceptions to the
ban on gray market importation. 165 The court thus determined that this
intent, coupled with Congressional acquiescence, supported the
regulations. '
66
Vivitar and Olympus illustrate a renewed judicial reluctance to question
the validity and limits of the Customs Service regulations.' 6 7 Vivitar has
been credited with destroying the barrier that the legislative and administra-
tive history erected barring related corporations from the protections of sec-
tion 526.16  Since 1936, the courts have attempted to rectify the tension1
6 9
between the literal wording of section 526' and the exceptions to the ban
on gray market imports promulgated by the Customs Service.17
Once the opinions upholding the customs regulations are examined, how-
ever, it becomes clear that each opinion failed to adequately justify the regu-
lations. The Guerlain court approached the problem from an antitrust point
of view,' 7 2 thus offering superficial support for the Customs Service regula-
tions. The Vivitar court upheld the 1972 regulations, 73 but indicated that
they were not determinative and were open to further examination. 7 4 The
161. Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 913.
162. Id. at 913-14.
163. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 316.
164. Id. at 320.
165. Id. at 321. Judge Oakes, however, espouses what is ultimately the point of this Note
by stating that "in light of the long acceptance of the regulations, change is a matter for the
legislative or executive branch and not the judiciary." Id.
166. Id.
167. Note, supra note 51, at 190.
168. Id. at 185.
169. Judicial attempts at quelling the fires of the gray market include United States v.
Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. 77 (D.N.Y. 1957), vacated 358 U.S. 915 (1958); Vivitar Corp. v. United
States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1085 (1988); Olympus, 792 F.2d
at 315.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1526; see also supra note 12.
171. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1)-(3).
172. Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 80-83.
173. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1)-(3).
174. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570.
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Olympus court also upheld the 1972 regulations,1 7 but failed to identify
convincing justifications for the Customs Service exceptions to the ban on
gray market importation. Thus, prior to K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 176 the
gray market exceptions that the Customs Service had promulgated stood
virtually unscathed, but essentially unjustified.
IV. K MART CORP. V. CARTIER, INC.: THE CONTINUATION OF FIFTY
YEARS OF UNCERTAINTY
In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 177 the Supreme Court explored for the
first time the validity of the 1972 Customs Service exceptions to the ban on
gray market goods.'1 7  Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy found the
common control exceptions to be consistent with section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, and thus valid.' 7 9 As to the authorized use exception, Justice
Kennedy, writing for a different majority,' 80 held this exception to be incon-
sistent with section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930.8'
A. The Common Control Exceptions
1. Justice Kennedy: A Cursory Examination of an Ambiguous Statute
Justice Kennedy's terse opinion 82 upheld the customs regulations al-
lowing the importation of foreign manufactured goods bearing a trademark
registered in the United States where the foreign and domestic trademark
holders were subject to common control. 8 3 He based his conclusion purely
on grounds of statutory interpretation.184 Justice Kennedy stated that if a
regulation is consistent with the original statute, the Court must defer to an
175. Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2033 (1988).
176. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
177. Id.
178. The common control, same company, and authorized use exceptions are codified in 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (1)-(3).
179. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1817. In this part of the opinion, Justice Kennedy was joined by
Justice White. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, concurred in a sepa-
rate opinion. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor, dissented from this part of the majority opinion.
180. Id. at 1818. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Blackmun, O'Connor, and
Stevens joined Justice Kennedy in a separate opinion invalidating the authorized use
exception.
181. Id. at 1819.
182. Justice Kennedy utilized less than six pages in wading through over 50 years of case
law and interpretations of § 526. Id. at 1814-19.
183. Id. at 1819.
184. Id. at 1817-18.
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agency's interpretation, and render that interpretation valid.'" 5 The courts,
obviously, may not alter the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.'86
Realizing that the Court was not blessed with interpreting an unambiguous
statute, however, Justice Kennedy explored whether the Customs Service's
interpretation of section 526 was permissible.' 87
In Justice Kennedy's view, section 526 was ambiguous about actual own-
ership of a United States trademark when the domestic trademark holder is
closely related to a foreign company."88 Justice Kennedy also found the
phrase "of foreign manufacture" equally ambiguous89 According to Jus-
tice Kennedy, this phrase could be interpreted as meaning "(1) goods manu-
factured in a foreign country, (2) goods manufactured by a foreign company
or (3) goods manufactured in a foreign country by a foreign company."'190
Emphasizing the imprecision prevalent in the statute, Justice Kennedy
stated that it would be reasonable for the Customs Service to assert that
"goods manufactured by a foreign subsidiary or division of a domestic com-
pany," are not goods which are deemed to be of foreign manufacture, and
therefore not protected by section 526.'9'
2. Justice Brennan's Concurrence: More Depth but Still Inadequate
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that
the common control exceptions were consistent with section 526, but he
reached that conclusion through a radically different analysis from that em-
ployed by Justice Kennedy. 192 Justice Brennan agreed that courts should
defer to an agency's interpretation which did not conflict with the statute. 193
Rather than simply agreeing with the majority's facial statutory interpreta-
tion, however, Justice Brennan examined the congressional history to up-
hold the interpretation promulgated by the Customs Service.' 94
The sole purpose of section 526, in Justice Brennan's view, was to overrule
the Katzel decision.' 95 Justice Brennan asserted that Congress intended sec-
tion 526 to apply to Katzel-type situations; situations in which an independ-
ent American company purchased trademark rights from a foreign
185. Id. at 1817.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1817-18.
188. Id. at 1817.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1818.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1819 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. Id. at 1821-23.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1824.
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manufacturer.' 96 Any intent concerning the applicability of section 526 to
affiliates of foreign manufacturers reflected an intent to exclude such manu-
facturers from the protections of section 526.' Justice Brennan supported
this reasoning by contending that the authors of section 526 realized that an
independent domestic business would not possess the same remedies to rec-
tify gray market importation problems that a subsidiary company does.198
In his view, the differences between an independent business and a related
business might have prompted Congress to exclude an affiliated company
from the protections of section 526.199
Justice Brennan also viewed the infamous floor debate as evincing con-
gressional intent to exclude foreign affiliates from the protections of section
526.2" Justice Brennan noted that Senator Lenroot posed the question of
section 526's applicability to foreign firms with subsidiaries in the United
States.2° ' The response of Senator McCumber,2 °2 in Justice Brennan's view,
indicates that section 526 would only apply where there had been a transfer
at arms length by an exclusively American firm.203
Justice Brennan also attested to the validity of the common control excep-
tions because of the Customs Service's promulgation and long-standing use
of such exceptions. 2" Tracing the common control exceptions from their
genesis in 1936205 to the most recent codification,2"6 Justice Brennan empha-
sized that the exceptions had been an accepted practice for the better part of
fifty years.20 7 In upholding the validity of the exceptions, Justice Brennan
reiterated the age-old premise that section 526 is not a flat ban on all gray
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1830.
198. Id. Justice Brennan maintained that independent companies, unlike affiliated compa-
nies, usually will lose all of the benefits obtained from the trademark which they purchased
when severe parallel importation occurs. Id. Justice Brennan stated further that if gray mar-
ket goods were actually detrimental to the American arm of a multinational affiliate, an agree-
ment could be reached within the affiliation to curb the gray market importation, a remedy
unavailable to an independent purchaser of a foreign trademark. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 1824-27.
201. Id.
202. 62 CONG. REC. 11,603-05 (1922).
203. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1823 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Brennan acknowledged that the floor debate constantly referred to a foreign company's
agent, not a subsidiary. Justice Brennan stated that "even if both Senators meant subsidiary
when they used the word 'agent,' Senator McCumber's answer squarely negated any sugges-
tion that § 526 would apply . I..." d
204. Id. at 1827.
205. T.D. 48,577, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936).
206. T.D. 72, 266, 6 Cust. Bull. 550 (1972); 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1), (2).
207. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1828 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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market goods.208 As an alternative argument, he proposed that even if his
interpretation is incorrect, it is at least reasonable, therefore making the
common control exceptions valid.2°9
3. Justice Scalia's Dissent: An Unambiguous Statute Yielding
Unambiguous Results
Disagreeing with the majority over the validity of the common control
exceptions, Justice Scalia questioned the majority's reading of the statute as
ambiguous.210 Justice Scalia read the statute as clear in determining
whether a parent company or a domestic subsidiary actually owned a partic-
ular trademark.211 A parent company may, or may not, own the assets of a
subsidiary, but a trademark registered and owned by a United States corpo-
ration could not be said to be owned by "anyone other than a United States
corporation. ,12 Justice Scalia also viewed the phrase "of foreign manufac-
ture" as equally unambiguous. 21 3 If the phrase is read in the proper context,
it can only be understood to refer to goods manufactured abroad.214
The majority's interpretation was extraordinary to Justice Scalia, not be-
cause it was illogical, but because it would eliminate the protection offered to
the "prototypical gray market victim. '2 15 As the majority read the statute,
an American firm, which purchased the rights to use a foreign company's
trademark in the United States, would not be able to bar the importation of
goods produced by another American company posessing foreign rights to
that same trademark because the goods would not be "of foreign manufac-
ture.",2 16 Justice Scalia viewed the majority's attempt to save the regulation
as promoting results antithetical to the basis of the statute.21 7 Justice Scalia
208. Id. at 1827.
209. Id. at 1826-27.
210. Id. at 1831 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1831-32.
214. Id. at 1832. Justice Scalia stated:
Words, like syllables, acquire meaning not in isolation but within their context.
While looking up the separate word "foreign" in a dictionary might produce the
reading the majority suggests, that approach would also interpret the phrase "I have
a foreign object in my eye" as referring, perhaps to something from Italy. The phrase
"of foreign manufacture" is a common usage, well understood to mean manufactured
abroad.
Id. at 1831.
215. Id. at 1832. The prototypical gray market victim is usually a domestic firm that
purchases, at arms length, the right to use and market a trademark from an autonomous for-
eign company. See id. at 1814 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
216. Id. at 1832 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
217. Id.
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also contended that even the Customs Service only intended the regulations
to encompass foreign-made goods.218
Justice Scalia concluded that the common control exceptions were an im-
permissible construction of section 526.219 Further revealing the insuffi-
ciency of the regulations, Justice Scalia pointed out that the current
regulations do not contain an effective enforcement mechanism.22 ° If the
government did not intend the results reached by the Court, then the Cus-
toms Service should amend the regulations or create a viable means of en-
forcement. 2 1 Justice Scalia acknowledged that courts routinely defer to
agency interpretations due to the expertise which the agency's possess.222 It
would burden the agency with a sisyphean task, however, to require it to
utilize an interpretation that it never envisioned.223
B. The Authorized Use Exception
1. Justice Kennedy: Continued Superficiality
Writing for the majority in regard to the authorized use exception, Justice
Kennedy briefly stated that the regulation could not be. squared with the
literal wording of section 526.224 The authorized use exception allows the
importation of gray market goods when the domestic trademark owner has
authorized a foreign company to use its trademark abroad.225 Justice Ken-
nedy viewed this exception as directly conflicting with section 526.226 Jus-
tice Kennedy did not expound on his reasoning, he merely stated that the
authorized use exception is in "conflict with the unequivocal language of the
statute.
' 2 27
218. Id. at 1832-33. Justice Scalia asserted that in the government's petition for writ of
certiorari, the government claimed that § 526 dealt only with "goods manufactured abroad."
Id.





224. Id. at 1814 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
225. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c) (3); see also supra note 19.
226. K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1818.
227. Id. at 1819. Justice Kennedy stated in a rather conclusory fashion that "[u]nder no
reasonable construction of the statutory language can goods made in a foreign country by an
independent foreign manufacturer be removed from the purview of the statute." Id. at 1818-
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2. Justice Brennan's Dissent. Continued Ambiguity
In his dissent,zz8 Justice Brennan determined the authorized use exception
to be consistent with section 526.229 Noting the uncertainty surrounding
trademark law when Congress enacted section 526,230 Justice Brennan
opined that section 526 did not unambiguously protect a company that au-
thorized the use of its trademark abroad from the importation of gray mar-
ket goods.231 Having found the statute ambiguous, Justice Brennan sought
to ascertain whether the interpretation of the Customs Service was worthy of
judicial deference.232 Justice Brennan explored the differences between the
prototypical gray market victim and a victim of the authorized use excep-
tion. z33 In his view, a company that authorizes the use of its trademark has
less at stake than a typical purchaser of a foreign trademark. 3a Moreover, a
company that authorizes the trademark's use has more control over the
trademark than one who has purchased rights to the trademark.2 35 Justice
Brennan viewed the authorizing company as being able to refuse to license
the use of their trademark, thus eliminating the possibility of becoming em-
broiled in a gray market imbroglio.236 Further buttressing his opinion, Jus-
tice Brennan stated that the Treasury Department, since 1951, has refused to
protect manufacturers who have authorized the use of their trademarks
abroad.2 37
3. Justice Scalia's Concurrence: A Vituperative Retort to Justice
Brennan 's Dissent
While concurring with the majority that the authorized use exception was
wholly inconsistent with section 526, Justice Scalia leveled a blast at the
logic Justice Brennan employed in his dissent.2 38 Justice Scalia argued that
228. Dissenting, Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, and Stevens, and joined
in part by Justice White.
229. Id. at 1828 (Brennan J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230. Id. at 1828-29. Justice Brennan revealed that there was much disagreement as to
whether a trademark holder could authorize a third party to use its trademark. Id. at 1828.
With this fact in mind, Justice Brennan asserted that Congress failed to address the authorized
use issue any more clearly than it addressed other gray market issues. Id. at 1829. The regula-
tion promulgated by the Customs Service, therefore, cannot be in clear conflict with an ambig-
uous statute. Id. at 1830-31.
231. Id. at 1828.
232. Id. at 1829-30.





238. Id. at 1833-34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the statute was not ambiguous because, when Congress enacted section 526,
trademark law recognized that trademarks could be bought or licensed.23 9
With this fact in hand, Justice Scalia asserted that Congress did appreciate
the possibility of transferability and chose not to allow the importation of
this type of gray market good.24 Justice Scalia also claimed that Justice
Brennan sanctioned the power to rewrite the United States Code in order to
effectuate the unenacted purposes of Congress.24 ' This, however, would re-
quire much extrapolation and would not achieve the results that Congress
had envisioned in formulating the statute.24 2
Justice Scalia could only justify disregarding the plain application of a
statute when "(1) it is clear that the alleged changed circumstances were
unknown to, and unenvisioned by, the enacting legislature, and (2) it is clear
that they cause the challenged application of the statute to exceed its original
purpose. ' 243 In Justice Scalia's view, none of these requirements were met,
thus rendering Justice Brennan's theory erroneous and warranting the ma-
jority's invalidation of the authorized use exception to the ban on the impor-
tation of gray market goods. 2 "
4. A Melange of Opinions Leaving Many Questions Unanswered
The Court, in constructing the methodology of the opinion, locked itself
into an analysis of typical gray market situations.2 45 Questions remain, how-
ever, about unanticipated situations. If the domestic subsidiary of a corpora-
tion becomes larger than its foreign parent, it will then become the center of
operations.24 6 This would be, in effect, an American firm that purchased the
trademark of a foreign manufacturer.24 7 Moreover, by failing to explore the
possibilities beyond the typical gray market scenarios, the Court left many
gray market questions open to further litigation.
Commentators speculated that the Supreme Court, in K Mart, would al-
low the merits of the case to influence the decision. 24 8 The Court, however,
failed to fulfill the prophecy, and by focusing narrowly on the validity of the
239. Id. at 1835.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1834.
242. Id. at 1834-35.
243. Id. at 1835.
244. Id. at 1836.
245. Palladino, supra note 1, at 19, col. 1.
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. Hensen, Gray Market Goods: A Lighter Shade of Black, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
249, 256 (1987). In cases where straightforward, statutory analysis is employed, the end result
can often conflict with the legislative intent. Id. at 256 n.28.
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customs regulations pertaining to section 526, the ambiguity and confusion
prevalent in the gray market remains untouched.
V. K MART: A FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE DIVERSE PROBLEMS
CAUSED BY GRAY MARKET IMPORTATION
Prior to K Mart, commentators expressed the view that only a Supreme
Court decision would alter the Customs Service regulations. 249  Neither
Congress nor the executive branch were enthusiastic 250 about the prospect of
grappling with the gray market, and individual suits at the federal district
court level proved ineffective in establishing consistency within the gray
market. 251' The Supreme Court in K Mart was burdened with the task that
many courts have failed to carry out, the issuance of a definitive ruling on
the validity of the exceptions to section 526 that the Customs Service had
promulgated.
A. K Mart: Superficial Support for the Common Control Exceptions,
Invalidation of the Authorized Use Exception, and the Effect on
the Importation of Gray Market Goods
1. The Common Control Exceptions
The K Mart Court was, understandably, preoccupied with determining
the validity of the customs regulations, therefore leaving larger problems
posed by gray market importation untouched. 22 In doing so, however, the
Court failed to make a thorough analysis of section 526, thereby upholding
the customs regulations on tenuous grounds. Justice Kennedy's facial exam-
ination of the common control exceptions2 5 3 essentially begged the question
as to the meaning of section 526. In doing so, Justice Kennedy, perpetuated
249. Id. at 254.
250. Id.
251. See generally Note, Vivitar Corp. v. United States: Where the Gray Market Goods
Controversy Began and Where it Might End, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 375, 407 (1987).
252. Even in focusing narrowly on the validity of the customs regulations, K Mart resulted
in numerous opinions employing radically different modes of analysis. See K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988). Compare the separate opinions of Justices Kennedy,
Brennan, and Scalia. Justice Kennedy views the problem solely from the point of statutory
interpretation. Id. at 1815. Justice Brennan proceeds on an examination of legislative history.
Id. at 1819-31 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority of Justice
Scalia's opinion is spent criticizing Justice Brennan's analysis. Id. at 1833-36 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). More pressing issues of the gray market discussed in
this Note appear to have been obscured by the narrow focus and divergent methods of analysis
employed by the Court.
253. Id. at 1815-18 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
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an uncertain interpretation of an ambiguous statute, thus leaving the regula-
tions open to further attack.
Justice Brennan, concurring, delved more deeply into the intent of Con-
gress in the enactment of section 526.254 Justice Brennan's interpretation of
section 526, however, simply represented another attempt at adapting
archaic legislation to unforseen circumstances. In upholding the common
control exceptions, Justice Brennan failed to establish the meaning of section
526, thereby offering weak support for the validity of the regulations and
perpetuating the confusion over the scope of section 526 and the exceptions
promulgated by the Customs Service. The opinion of Justice Brennan did,
however, deal with the effect of the gray market on domestic merchants.2 55
Due to the authorization of the common control exceptions, this may be
indicative of the analysis future courts will employ.
2. The Authorized Use Exception
The Court's invalidation of the authorized use exception did not elicit the
confusion prevalant in the common control exceptions. Once again taking a
narrow view, Justice Kennedy opined that the ambiguous language of sec-
tion 526 did not pertain to the authorized use exception.25 6 In his view,
authorization of this regulation would allow importation of foreign goods
bearing a domestic trademark by companies that were truly independent of
the domestic trademark holder, thus clearly conflicting with the wording of
section 526.257
In concurring, Justice Scalia conducted a more comprehensive examina-
tion of the gray market.2" 8 His examination of the authorized use exception
concluded that domestic merchants would be adversely affected by the ex-
ception, therefore warranting the invalidation of the regulation. 259 The
Court's bifurcated invalidation of the authorized use exception contains
strands of the comprehensive examination warranted by gray market
problems. It does not, however, rectify the shortcomings of the Supreme
Court's opinion in K Mart Corp v. Cartier, Inc.
Due to the rejuvination of the common control exceptions, the K Mart
decision has been heralded as a great victory for the importers of gray mar-
254. Id. at 1819-28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. Justice Brennan considered the economic ramifications of gray market importation on
those parties that license their trademark. Id. at 1830. Economic considerations, a crucial
aspect of the gray market, demand increased attention in the future.
256. Id. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1833-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
259. Id. at 1836.
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ket goods, essentially opening the flood gates to gray market importation.26°
K Mart, however, is a double-edged sword because the invalidation of the
authorized use exception will accordingly limit the importation of gray mar-
ket goods.26 ' Due to the convoluted decision handed down by the Court,
commentators suggest that "there may be more gray market goods imported
into the United States and, then again, there may not." '262
B. K Mart and Considerations of Quality and Goodwill
While authentically trademarked, gray market goods are not necessarily
of the same quality as "regular goods., 2 63 Often the goods are produced in
exactly the same manner, but factors such as quality control and shipping
can affect the quality of a product, essentially causing gray market goods to
be of a different caliber than non-gray market goods.264 Consumers, there-
fore, may be receiving goods inferior to those which were purchased from
authorized distributors.265 Moreover, gray market goods may be inferior to
domestic goods with respect to United States safety requirements, 266 poten-
tially the most devastating drawback to gray market shopping. The
Supreme Court, in viewing gray market goods solely in light of section 526
and by tenets of statutory interpretation, failed to explore pertinent issues of
the gray market, thus leaving the problems to smolder until ignited by a
more volatile situation.
In K Mart, the Court also failed to consider what effect the authorization
of the common control exceptions would have on the goodwill associated
with trademarks.2 67 Goodwill, which is said to be an inseparable part of a
product, has a synergistic effect when combined with a trademark that en-
hances the products marketability. 268 In gray market cases, an actionable
suit must contain the assertion that a domestic product has developed sepa-
260. Joelson & Griffen, Gray Market Goods: U.S. Supreme Court Decides, 16 INT'L Bus.
LAW, 346, 346 (1988).
261. See K Mart, 108 S. Ct. at 1818 (Justice Kennedy's invalidation of the authorized use
exception).
262. Palladino, supra note 1, at 19, col. 1.
263. Note, supra note 51, at 190; see also Osawa Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
264. Note, supra note 51, at 190.
265. Id.
266. Id,
267. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) (The Court viewed the
validity of the customs regulations from the point of statutory interpretation and legislative
history).
268. See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 58, at § 3:5.
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rate and recognizable goodwill that is, in fact, associated with the
product.269
It is true that mere expenditure of money in the quest of goodwill does not
give rise to an interest that can be protected.27 ° Many domestic trademark
holders, however, spend millions of dollars in developing and facilitating
separate and distinct goodwill.2 ' With the assertion of goodwill, there also
must be a strong likelihood of confusion as to the origin of a product. 272 The
Supreme Court obviously did not consider how the authorization of com-
mon control, gray market goods will bear on the millions of dollars invested
yearly by companies who have established and are maintaining goodwill.27 3
The issue, due to economic reasons, warrants congressional exploration as
gray market importations steadily rise.
C. K Mart and the Ability to Bring Private Actions Under Section 526
Most actions arising under section 526 are not private actions, but rather,
involve a suit against the United States, thus further limiting the relief avail-
able to domestic merchants.274 Some companies, however, have chosen. to
challenge the gray market by directly confronting the gray market import-
ers.275 Businesses have used claims such as trademark infringement and vio-
lation of contractual provisions to thwart the gray market tide, but the
results have been inadequate.276
Moreover, private actions are not entertained in the United States Court
of International Trade,27 7 and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has revealed that the district courts are better suited to deal
269. Note, The Gray Market Controversy: Is a Resolution Necessary 13 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 279, 303 (1987).
270. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 58, § 2:10; see also Fleetwood v. Mende, 298 F.2d 797,
799 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
271. See Note, supra note 51, at 198-201 (The author generally deals with harm suffered by
trademark holders due to gray market importation.).
272. Id.
273. See supra note 252; see also supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
274. Restani, supra note 64, at 237.
275. Id. at 243.
276. Id.
277. The text of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), which deals with the jurisdiction of the Court of
International Trade, reads:
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of International Trade by
subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the exception set forth in subsection
(j) of this section, the Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of any civil action commenced against the United States, its agencies, or its offices
Id. (emphasis added).
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with the problem. 78 Although K Mart may not have been the perfect forum
to litigate questions of private action, commentators viewed the K Mart deci-
sion as potentially broad enough to eradicate the confusion of private action
in the gray market. 279 Alternately, they saw K Mart as having the potential
to skim over the issue of private action.2 8° The Supreme Court, in its cur-
sory opinion, has opted for the latter leaving the question of private action
under section 526 unanswered.
VI. CONCLUSION
The gray market has posed troublesome questions for the government,
merchants, and consumers for over a century. Congress, pressured by the
Second Circuit's holding in A. Bourois & Co. v. Katzel hastily implemented
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 in an attempt to protect the interests of
American merchants. Beginning in 1936, the United States Customs Service
began to make exceptions to section 526's draconian ban on the importation
of foreign goods bearing a registered United States trademark. The courts
have reached conflicting decisions as to the validity of these exceptions,
thereby causing greater confusion over the importation of gray market
goods.
In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., the Supreme Court faced the validity of
the customs regulations, as well as domestic and economic issues that are
inevitably implicated by gray market importation. The Court failed to effec-
tively examine the former, and it ignored the latter. Rather than relying on
the Supreme Court's superficial interpretation of an archaic, inoperative stat-
ute, new legislation is required to effectively deal with the diverse problems
posed by the gray market. Congressional impulsiveness instigated the confu-
sion prevalent in the gray market. Congressional compulsiveness is war-
ranted to comprehensively examine the diverse problems presented by the
importation of gray market goods.
John J. McNamara
278. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 1055 (1986).
279. See Restani, supra note 64, at 242.
280. Id.
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